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Abstract
Since the inception of the special period and the loss of its traditional export markets for sugar 
and other goods, Cuba has turned towards services as new sources of foreign exchange. 
Tourism has been reactivated and its performance has been broadly satisfactory, yet its long 
term growth potential should not be overstated. Since the mid-2000s, a new sector - 
professional services - has become the island's largest foreign exchange earner. Cuba's 
comparative advantage in this sector is the product of  decades of human capital investment in 
social services. Yet, the sustainability of Cuba's present trade structure cannot be taken for 
granted. In the future, export-oriented professional services, and the health cluster in 
particular, might  not only contribute to  release the balance of payments constrain, but also 
play a  pivotal role in steering  the evolution Cuba's economy towards a  knowledge-based 
development path. To this purpose, however, major changes in the area of industrial and 
macroeconomic policies are required.
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1. The rebirth of tourism    
In Cuba health, education, and other social services have been  prioritized 
since the early years after the Revolution, and grew constantly even in the resource-
starved 1990s and 2000s.1 On the other hand, non-social services were relatively 
underdeveloped, consistently  with the pro-material production bias prevailing in most 
socialist countries at the time. While tourism, in particular, had been an important 
component of pre-revolutionary Cuba's economy and of its external trade structure, its 
economic role almost withered out. Thus, Cuba's services exports did not play any 
significant role until the early 1990s.  
The situation changed  completely under the extreme penury of the special 
period, when policy-makers  were forced to reactivate tourism as the only sector 
holding a potential for substantial foreign exchange gains in the short term, besides 
exerting and important multiplier impact through its multiple backward linkages with 
the rest of  the economy . The rapid growth in the exports of  tourist services and of 
other ancillary services  sub-sectors,  such as  travel services and services supplied  to 
foreigners inside the national territory) was even more crucial to allow Cuba's 
progressive (if partial) economic recovery2  because it  was paralleled by a dramatic 
decline of goods and commodities exports3. As a result, tourism and other commercial 
services came to constitute the bulk of Cuba's total exports during most of the 1990s 
and until the early 2000s (see Pico García  and Rodríguez  2006).
The tourism cluster was accorded a much higher degree of priority than in the 
past, and some of its components benefited from the moderately liberalizing reforms 
enacted since 1994 and by the inflow of FDI.  Most hotel building construction was 
carried out entirely by Cuban firms, but  upscale  hotels were managed mainly by the 
1 As most social services were provided free or quasi-free to the population, their relative contribution 
to GDP ended  up being underestimated. This bias ended with the introduction of the new GDP 
estimation methodology in 2003. The new methodology evaluates the contribution of social services to 
GDP on the basis of a kind of "shadow prices" based on international comparisons. However, the new 
approach is not fully immune to critiques either, and has been accused  by some observers of 
provoking a bias of opposite sign with respect to the , i.e. of leading to an overestimation of the true 
value of Cuba's social services (see Pérez-López and  Mesa-Lago 2009).
2 Vidal and Fundora (2008) show econometrically the crucial relevance of the balance of payments 
constraint for Cuba's growth.  
3 Exports from the goods-producing macro-sectors declined both in price and in volume terms.
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foreign partners  as part of a  joint venture  arrangement.4 By the mid-2000s, the 
tourist sector was generating directly and indirectly about 30000 jobs and about 2 bn 
dollars. Most visitors  are from Canada and Europe, but in recent years  arrivals of 
Cuban-Americans from the US and of citizens of ALBA countries have been on the 
rise.
Contrary to the negative trends prevailing in most other goods-producing 
areas, Cuba also managed to enact a successful process of import-substitution in some 
niche sub-sectors  that supply inputs and intermediate goods to the hotels and other 
tourist facilities. As a result, the  leakage effect was substantially reduced, and by 
2005 2/3 of the purchases by tourist  firms were supplied by Cuban  producers of 
goods and services. Among the success stories   there are those of  beer (95% of 
tourist consumption is supplied by Cuban producers) and of the "casas de 
sombra"(shadow houses),  over 1000  specialized agricultural micro- enterprises that 
produce vegetables all the year long.5  The tourism cluster has grown into a 
consolidated, internationally competitive, as well as (relatively6) efficient and 
sustainable component of Cuba's economy. Yet, its expansion appears to have peaked 
- at least in a medium term horizon - in the mid- 2000s7 (see Table 1), due to diverse 
factors such as the progressive exhaustion of the potential constituted  by the best 
natural  spots, the negative impact of the re-centralization policy shift, the bank crisis, 
and the depressing effect of the worldwide recession on global tourism services 
demand. 
4 About 40% of Cuba's hotel are run by mixed enterprises.
5 According to estimates, domestic purchases by tourist firms have  about an  income generation impact 
of the order of 1.5 through the multiplier effect, and the leakage effect has been  considerably reduced: 
for each dollar of tourist earnings, up to 70 cents stay in Cuba (Figures Perez  2004).
6 In spite of their high degree of  autonomy with respect to most other  enterprises, hotels and other 
tourism firms are negatively affected by the bank crisis, the recurrent non-availability of inputs and 
consumer goods,  the overvaluation of the CUC and   many other structural  distortions.  Moreover, the 
long-term  sustainability of natural resources-based tourism development  is always questionable.
7 Income from tourism increased slowly in the early 2000s, stabilized afterwards in 2005-2008 at 
around 2.3 bn CUC (pesos convertibles) and fell in 2009 to 2.1 mn. The number of visitors increased in 
2000-2005, from 1.77 mn in 2000 to 2.3 mn in 2005, fell slightly in 2006-2007 and recovered 
afterwards, reaching 2.43 mn in 2009. The average rate of room occupation  has declined in the mid-
2000s (probably due to  the construction of many new hotels) and then has kept oscillating around 
60% (see Table 1). 
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With respect to the policy options that the government might consider to 
maintain and enhance the considerable progress achieved so far, the most fundamental 
question revolves  around the ownership of the main means of production. In my 
view,  taking into account the strategic role of tourism for the sustainability of Cuba's 
economy,, the present state-centred policy approach is basically correct. In  fact, 
tourism is  obviously different from  social services, yet it presents some similarities 
with respect to the  justification of a strong presence of the State, at least in the  upper, 
large scale, fully formal segment of the sector.8  On one hand, particularly in a rather 
small island country like Cuba, tourism should not be left to spontaneous market 
forces. On the contrary, this activity requires a fair dose  of both economic and 
physical planning, as its  sustainability depends on  on the availability  of transport 
and communication infrastructure and on the preservation of  natural resources9. On 
the other hand, formal and relatively large-scale tourist activities are bound to be 
characterized by a high degree of property concentration and monopoly power and by 
a significant dependency on foreign capital  and know-how, no matter whether the 
domestic counterpart is mainly State- or privately-owned.  Moreover, even assuming 
the likelihood of some efficiency losses,, the prevalence of state ownership  can be 
justified on distributional grounds, taking into account  the implicit monopoly rents 
that it generates.
However, the Cuban  State  is also well-advised in avoiding overstating the 
long-term growth potential of tourism. This sector is already fairly developed in 
Havana and in the few other urban centers that present a significant historical , artistic 
and cultural interest, and also in many of the suitable seaside locations.  So far, the 
pressure on the natural environment is broadly  sustainable, but there is little room for 
further quantitative expansion. Relevant,, yet progressively diminishing  gains can be 
obtained mainly through upgrading and better integrating the tourism value chain, 
thereby strengthening its the multiplier  effect. Progress can and should be achieved 
especially  in areas such as the further reduction of  leakages, , the promotion of inter-
8 Through backward linkages stemming from tourists' demand of locally supplied nonessential goods 
and services, tourism  can generate and sustain a myriad of  individual and small-scale commercial and 
productive activities. In Cuba, most of  these  activities are still overregulated and excessively 
repressed, but a process of liberalization is presently under way...
9 Disastrous counterexamples of anarchic tourism development that led to the  the destruction of the 
natural environment  for the benefit of the few  are rife both in  developing and developed countries.
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sectoral linkages, and the quantitative and qualitative  enhancement of the supply of 
non-hotel ancillary services10 (such as bars, restaurants, and urban transportation).  
Table  1.
Tourism statistics
                                                                           2000            2005              2008           2009
International arrivals (000s)                             1774             2319                2348          2430
     America                                                         784             1216               1380          1536
     Europe                                                           949              1048                 909           838
Foreign exchange earnings (Mn CUC)            1948              2399                 2347        2106
Rate of  room occupation (annual average)         74.2               63.6                 60.1          59.8 
Source: ONE 2010
2. The boom of professional  services exports  
Since the mid-2000s a new services sector has become prominent in Cuba's 
trade structure. For the first time, the potential comparative advantage created  by 
decades of human capital investment in social services began to be exploited for an 
economic,  non-(directly) social purposes: to contribute to redress Cuba's  structural 
balance of payments disequilibrium.  Almost overnight, thanks to the new, more 
favourable regional geopolitical external scenario  created by the emergence of 
friendly governments in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, exports of 
health and other professional services overcame tourism as Cuba's  largest foreign 
10 Contrary to the core component of the tourism business - hotel services - these ancillary services 
activities  are not generally suitable to direct state management, and should be left mostly to individual 
and private entrepreneur, consistently with the new policy approach launched in the summer and fall of 
2010. 
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exchange earner  (see Pico García  2003,2004, Pico García  and Rodríguez., 2006 
Triana Cordoví  2008,, 2010,  Triana Cordoví,  Torres Pérez  and Martín Fernández 2005 ).
Health services exports (including teaching services in the area of health) can 
in principle be realized according to all the four modes  of  supply  covered by the 
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): cross-border supply (Mode 
1), . consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3), and presence of 
natural persons (Mode 4) (see WTO 2010), .Telemedicine   is a classical example of a 
service delivered cross-border in real time (Mode 1). According to mode 2, patients 
travel abroad to be attended in the service- exporting country (health tourism).  Under 
Mode 3, a  public or private agent in country A establishes a commercial presence in 
county B, in order to manage a hospital, a clinic, a medical consulting centre, or to 
supply  health services in some other form. Under Mode 4, health professionals such 
as doctors, dentists, nurses, technicians,  and other skilled  personnel temporarily 
migrate abroad  in order to supply health services to the local population.
In the case of Cuba, the most important modes of exporting health services are 
Mode 2 and mode 4. The first health services exports were recorded in 198011 under 
Mode 2.  Health tourism and health teaching activities were subsequently expanded 
with the creation of SERVIMED12 in 1987 and in the 1990s, as part of the overall 
development of the tourist sector.  SERVIMED was later transformed into a larger 
entity, Cubanacán Turismo y Salud, that runs three main sets of programs: 
International Medical Services, Tourist Medical Services, and Life Quality Services. 
International Medical Services is the most important one, and it consists in  attracting 
foreign patients who are attended both in specialized   facilities and in hospitals and 
clinics belonging to the National Health System.  Among Cuba's "specialties" that 
contribute to sustain its comparative advantage the following  are worth mentioning : 
rehabilitation therapies for drugs and alcohol addicts13;  treatment of pigment 
rethinosis, vitiligo, psoriasis, alopecia; surgical and clinical programs, including 
esthetical  surgery and , neurological restauration; health checks and check ups (see 
Cuba Health Tourism 2010). Nowadays, many   patients attended in Cuban health 
11 Between 1963 and 1984 over 18000 Cuban  health workers travelled to Algeria and many other 
countries, to provide assistance to the local populations in a framework of non-commercial 
internationalist solidarity.
12 Now Cubanacan Turismo y Salud (CTS). 
13 One famous beneficiary of Cuba's specialized expertise in this area was Diego Maradona.
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facilities come to the island in the framework of the intergovernmental  agreements 
with Venezuela and other countries belonging to the Bolivarian Alternative  for 
Americas (ALBA)14. 
Tourist Medical Services focuses on tourists  temporarily residing in Cuba 
through a  network of specialized clinics  and ambulatories established in hotels and 
tourist destinations. Life Quality Services advertises and commercializes programs of 
life quality improvement, including esthetical treatments, thalassotherapy, and SPAs. 
In the 1997-2005 period  over 30000 foreign patients were treated in Cuba15, and their 
numbers have been increasing further during the second half of the decade.
Cuba is also experimenting with cross-border supply and commercial presence 
in the area of health services, although the activities carried out under these two 
modes are to be seen mainly as ancillary to the promotion of services exports under 
Modes 2 and 4.16  Telediagnosis, teleconsulting and teleteaching services are 
sometimes provided to foreign customers free of charge, mainly  as form of 
advertising for the country's health services industry. Cuba has established branches 
of the Placental Histotherapy  Clinic in Spain and  in several Latin American 
countries, and since 2004 has been  participating in setting up assistance facilities, not 
only in ALBA countries but also in other developing countries such as Algeria and 
China. Yet, as information on the extent of Cuba's share in the ownership on most of 
these facilities is not available, it is not clear to what extent they actions represent 
forms of commercial presence in the proper sense.17   
Exports of medical  teaching services started in  the early 1990s with 
postgraduate courses in ophthalmology and in other  areas. The goal was originally 
that of raising some funds in order to achieve a degree of  self-financing for the 
14 Only part of the health services received by these patients is paid, thereby generating exports. The 
rest is constituted by donations.  Cuba keeps providing health and health/related services to foreigners 
free of charge under a number of other modalities, such as the activities of the Latin American 
Medicine School near  Habana, the Integral Health Program, and the Miracle Operation, aimed at 
attending low/income  patients affected by serious sight disturbances from Venezuela and other Latin 
American countries.   As most health services activities benefiting foreigner patients in the framework 
of ALBA are  attended by the newly/formed  institution Servicios Medicos Cubanos, Cubanacán is 
increasingly focusing on medical cooperation with non/ALBA countries.
15 Source: Pico García and  Rodríguez  , 2006 (estimate).
16  At least, so far.  Both cross-border supply and commercial presence health service delivery modes 
hold a potential for future development, that could be exploited provided  appropriate support policies 
are enacted. 
17 According to GATS rules, commercial presence requires full or controlling ownership rights.
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Centers of High Medical Education  and for the national health system at large, in a 
period of acute scarcity of funds. With time, these programs have been growing, 
attracting up to 500 students  and generating earnings of the order of 10 million 
dollars per year.  
Over 100000 Cuban health workers have been travelling abroad, often for 
prolonged periods, since the early 1960s. Exports of health services under Mode 4 in 
the proper sense18 started in 1985, when 313 Cuban professionals were contracted to 
supply health services in Libya, Algeria, and Kuwait19. 
Cuban health workers are deployed abroad under two modalities, Technical 
Assistance and Technical and Professional  Services. Only Professional and Technical 
Services, which are delivered both in the framework of intergovernmental agreements 
and  in other forms, including contracting by international organizations, generate 
foreign exchange earnings for the country.20 Most Cubans providing professional and 
technical services are in Venezuela and other ALBA countries.21 
According to estimates, only a small minority (about 12%) of all the health 
personnel sent abroad by Cuba since the 1960s have done so under a foreign-
exchange-generating modalities, but their numbers have been soaring since 2003.  In 
that year a new major health program focusing on  the establishment of a network of 
community doctors in poor neighbourhoods(Barrio Adentro I)  was launched in 
Venezuela.  The program was subsequently expanded to cover  the needs for 
specialized medical treatments in newly-created facilities spread all over the country 
(Barrio Adentro II). As a result, the number of Cuban health professionals working in 
18 I.e., under  foreign-exchange generating arrangements (usually  in the framework of 
intergovernmental agreements), rather than as donations.
19 See Pico García  and  Rodríguez  2006.  It is noticeable that (as the Kuwait example shows) the 
opening of this new export opportunity cannot be attributed only to the previous existence of special 
inter-governmental political linkages. This shows that, since the beginning, Cuba's health services 
exports developed to a large extent on the basis of a genuine comparative advantage, that could be 
exploited according to the prevailing structure of  world relative prices.
20 Technical Assistance consists in sending health workers and other skilled personnel to countries 
affected by particularly harsh sanitary conditions or natural disasters. Cuba provides these services free 
of charge, as a form of aid.  
21 Other forms of specialized health-related activities are carried out by the Henry Reeve international 
team of doctors specialized  in disaster and grave epidemics.
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Venezuela climbed at over 23000 by end-200522, and kept increasing thereafter - at 
present, it is estimated at over 30000.23
Policy-makers realize the strategic role of knowledge-intensive and potentially 
tradable sectors, and are supporting  several promotion initiatives and programs also 
in areas different from or only partly related to the health cluster. The Cuban centre 
for the promotion of foreign trade (CEPEC in Spanish)  identified  a set of 
potentialities in "other scientific and technological services" (STS) areas, where Cuba 
has already reached a certain degree of development, such as  geology, geophysics, 
environment, engineering, hydrology,  and civil construction projects and 
postgraduate education (including on line teaching). Among others, specialized 
activities involving  STS are being carried out and further promoted , such as: 
technological and feasibility studies;  laboratory analyses; specialized consulting; 
reverse engineering; scientific and technological information management; 
geological, mining,  and hydrological  exploration and prospecting, radiological, sport 
medicine, and  environmental services . According to Pico García "studies on the STS 
in Cuba showed that there is a set of entities , institutions, R&D centers  which do 
hold a potential  to deliver  several high quality services, some of which have been 
exported, among which…environmental studies, …management systems, industrial 
security  studies…(Pico García 2009a, p.7)." 
Yet, this potential is severely constraint by Cuba's lack of international 
integration and the dearth of domestic investment in key technological facilities and 
infrastructure. There are, however, some promising exceptions.  Since the issuing of 
the strategic directives for the informatization  of society   in 1997, Cuba made 
important investments  in the computer and related services sector. Computer skills 
teaching was generalized, all educational institutions were provided  PCs, computers, 
and one new specialized higher-education institution (the university of informatics, 
UCI in Spanish) was created. Notwithstanding its limitations, 24 the UCI, albeit 
22 In the framework of the Barrio Adentro I and Barrio Adentro II programs, Cuban health workers 
attended  over 17 million Venezuelans in 2005 , carrying out 175 million consults/visits.
23 Source: Pico García 2009a (estimate).In Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, in other ALBA countries, 
this massive influx of Cuban doctors and other professionals dramatically altered the structure of the 
domestic private market for health services.  Not everybody liked this development, and some social 
sectors developed an aggressive negative attitude towards Cuban health workers (see Pico García 
2006).  
24 The process of human capital formation taking place in this new excellence centre is in practice 
quite de-linked from the  rest of the country's economy. 
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supported by other entities, is basically the only institution where  software 
production takes place  and some (still modest) foreign exchange earnings are 
generated from software exports (to Venezuela).25 
3.   Is Venezuela subsidizing Cuba ?
The relative de-integration of Cuba's economy, with its exceptional degree of 
tertiarization and the parallel under-development of industry and agriculture,   have 
contributed to some statistical inconsistencies since the introduction of the new GDP 
estimate methodology in 200426 .  The most relevant implication of these 
inconsistencies is likely to have been an overestimation of the GDP growth rate in the 
mid-2000s. 27 As the reform led to a higher estimate of services GDP since the year when it 
started , it might have led to estimates of GDP growth rates higher than those that would have 
resulted from the old methodology for that very year (because the value produced in  services 
activities GDP was now  computed on the basis of higher prices, without correspondingly 
reducing the value of goods-producing activities). Afterwards,  the GDP growth rates 
estimated  with the new methodology were probably higher than those that would have 
resulted applying the old one, because services kept growing faster  than goods.28
These critical observations, however, do not imply that the surge  in Cuba's 
professional services export is a statistical fabrication, a sort of fig leaf covering a 
25 The UCI might  advance especially in "unorthodox" software   domains such as the development of 
developing "free" software products  (i.e. like Linux), possibly in  cooperating with foreign partners.
26 The  introduction of the new GDP evaluation methodology  was initially criticized by the CEPAL 
(the UN commission  for Latin America and the Caribbean), which published its own set of estimates. 
Subsequent discussions between CEPAL and the Cuban government led eventually to a new partial 
methodology change, that was considered satisfactory by both sides (see CubaEncuentro 2008).
27 With respect to the international relative prices prevailing in world markets and to standard statistical 
evaluation and measurement methodologies.
28 Even if this were the case, this would not mean that the methodology reform was squarely wrong, as 
far as the new and higher prices attached to services activities are in fact more correct and more close 
to those which would prevail under standard international evaluation methodology practices. For a 
critical discussion of the difficulties that can be encountered in interpreting Cuban official statistics and 
especially for using them to make meaningful international comparisons, see for instance Pérez-López 
ando Mesa-Lago 2009, González-Corzo 2009. 
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huge degree of subsidization on the part of Venezuela.  Actually, only scant 29 
available information is available on the prices and the payment and financing 
conditions  established in the framework of the Cuban-Venezuelan trade agreement 
for medical services and oil respectively. As official data on the price of Cuban 
professional services exports in particular are lacking,  the issue is object of 
speculation. Mesa Lago 2008, on the basis of calculations he does not detail, 
proposes an estimate of €144,000/year for the average annual cost paid by the 
Venezuelan state to purchase the services of  one Cuban health worker. Taking into 
account that Cuba's health workers are not only doctors, but also nurses and 
technicians, he claims that "this is obviously an overestimate (of the true value of 
these services), as "a Venezuelan (doctor)… does not make that kind of money. So 
there is an implicit subsidy in this operation." (Mesa Lago 2008, p.16). 
This estimate, along with the preferential prices  paid by Cuba for importing 
Venezuelan oil, leads  Mesa -Lago to claim that the special bilateral trade agreement 
between the two ALBA countries actually hides a huge implicit subsidy: "Cuba 
started to receive substantial subsidies; for instance Venezuela sends Cuba 100,000 
barrels of oil a day at a preferential price of US$27 while the average world price per 
barrel was US$65 in 2006 and US$75 dollars in 2007. So the subsidy Cuba received 
was worth US$2.5 billion in 2007 (€1.700 billion)." (Mesa -Lago 2008, p.7)
As a matter of fact a very rough comparison of  the orders of magnitude of 
Cuba's services exports does appear to lead to  a rather high valuation for the export 
price of professional services. according to a EIU  estimate  (see EIU 2010). 
According to independent estimates, exports of professional services in 2009 were 7.7 
bn CUC ( roughly correspondent to  9bn  US dollars or 6.4 bn euros), while the 
number of Cuban professionals working abroad is estimated at about 50000 (see EIU 
2010, Gazon 2010).30 
29 Cuba and Venezuela have ample and legitimate economic, political, and military reasons not to 
disclose  the  details of their strategic trade agreement. 
30 This estimate is partly based on data released  by the  Ministry of Foreign  Trade in November 2009. 
The same source puts tourism revenues at 2 bn CUC, and would therefore  indicate that Cuba's total 
services exports in 2009  were of the order of 10 bn CUC. 
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A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that  Cuba appears to be receiving31 
for each of them  a sum of the order of 130000 euros per year, lower than Mesa 
Lago's estimate32 but of the same order of magnitude. These numbers are about twice 
as big as those of an unofficial estimate  circulating in Cuba in  mid-2010, that  was of 
the order of  50- 60000 euros per year.  However, even if the highest estimates 
proposed above  were approximately  correct, they would not fully validate Mesa 
Lago's assertion that   they amount to a Venezuelan subsidy to Cuba.  Even if it is true 
that Venezuelan doctors earn less, Venezuela would not be  in a position to hire 
enough doctors inside the country to accomplish the tasks that are presently carried 
out by Cubans in the framework of the Barrio Adentro and other  programs, due to 
two the simple reasons. The first is that there  are not enough doctors in Venezuela. 
The second is that very few of them would accept to work in the marginal areas where 
the Cubans do go, much less to live there. Finally, it has to be taken into account that 
the cost of specialized  services supplied by  very qualified foreign professionals in a 
developing country should not be compared to  the prices of   nominally similar 
services in the domestic market, but to the prices prevailing in the international 
market for professional services. 
It is thus fair, in my view, to acknowledge that  even if the terms of trade 
established in the bilateral trade accord are someway more favourable to Cuba that 
those that would prevail if both oil and professional services were sold exactly at their 
respective international market prices33, it is also  probably the case that Venezuela 
actually got a unique bargain. In fact, Venezuela  managed to dramatically extend and 
improve  the provision of basic medical health services to its population  over a very 
short period of time, to an extent that would not have been thinkable otherwise, either 
on the basis of its domestic sectoral  supply potential, nor on that of acquiring these 
services on international  markets from any other source. Actually, there was only one 
country  in the world that could materially export these services in such a huge 
quantity - Cuba.  Such a major improvement in Venezuela's its social welfare function 
31 Cuban workers abroad are paid  in form of wages and  benefits a  fraction of what the country earns 
thanks to their activities. Yet, compared to wages in Cuba, incentives are strong enough to produce a 
fierce competition for  the posts abroad among doctors and other professionals.
32 CML 's estimate referred to 2005, when both Cuba's foreign exchange  earnings from professional 
services export and the number of Cuban professionals working abroad were lower than  in the late 
2000s.
33 Due to the extremely heterogeneous nature of professional services, the notion of a standards world 
market price for each of them is more difficult to grasp than that of the world  price of oil.
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-  at least, as interpreted by its government, as it is the case in  any real-world situation 
-  was achieved at the relatively  modest cost of foregoing the convertible exchange 
rate earnings from a fraction of its huge oil exports. 
4. Sources of Cuba's international competitivenness
Cuba's relatively high degree of international competitiveness in professional 
services is thus a real and important phenomenon, that has been made possible mainly 
by three factors. The first one,, as mentioned above, is the  traditional priority 
accorded to health and education in the centralized process of resources allocation, on 
the basis  of  social rather than economic motivations.. 
Another one, less immediately recognizable, source of Cuba's competitiveness 
stems from the intrinsic characteristics of social services. These activities are based to 
a large extent on direct human interactions, with a relatively high degree of de-linking 
from most other relations of production and exchange. Their basic nature implies that 
ensuring universal access to key social services is an utmost policy priority. As 
opposed, for instance, to agriculture - where decentralized micro-management 
decisions must continuously be taken by local producers to respond according to ever-
changing  climatic and other natural conditions - the core actions constituting health 
and education activities (such as carrying out vaccination and  anti-illiteracy 
campaigns, besides regularly delivering standardized  packages of teaching and health 
care services  all over the national territory)  are quite amenable to a central planning 
approach. Conversely, the functioning of social services  require a relatively smaller 
role of market regulation and material incentives etc with respect to most  commercial 
services and goods-producing activities.
Thirdly, health and education these sectors are human, rather than capital 
intensive, and not very import-dependent. Therefore, in these areas so decisive for 
basic human development,  considerable progress can be achieved in a quasi-autarchic 
fashion,  even in the midst of  an overall context characterized by a very stringent 
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foreign exchange constraint and by a  general decay of  material infrastructure and the 
production of goods. Yet, this particular form of  non economically driven  (human) 
capital accumulation  can - as it did in Cuba - eventually lead to the generation of a 
latent international competitiveness susceptible to be harnessed  in terms of services 
exports
The growth potential of the health services "industry"  as a foreign exchange 
earner and an engine of growth for the Cuban economy as whole is substantial, at 
least in principle. However, this goal cannot be achieved   expanding further the sheer 
number of  health personnel working abroad, which is actually hardly sustainable at 
its present level. As a matter of fact, he inevitable negative consequences of such a 
massive (albeit temporary) migration of skilled practitioners on the quality of the 
health services provided to the Cuban population are already being felt.34 
 In  order to exploit its growth potential in the domain of health services 
exports, Cuba  should  deepening and intensify the going investment and 
reorganization efforts aimed at  upgrading  and diversifying health services supply 
and delivery capabilities. Health tourism (a form of exporting services according to 
under Mode 2) holds particularly favourable growth  prospects. Both the number of 
foreign patients in Cuban hospitals, clinics, and SPAs, and the average foreign 
exchange earnings per patient are amenable to increase, not only  under 
intergovernmental agreement modalities, but also  attracting relatively wealthy 
individual patients in global world markets. There are interesting development 
possibilities as well in the still-underdeveloped area of telemedicine and tele-teaching 
in health (delivered under Mode 1), and in the interaction between Modes 3 and 4 
through the expansion of  the commercial presence abroad of Cuban health 
organizations and institutions. Cuba might also specialize further in the  provision of 
consulting services in the area of  planning and managing  decentralized, multiple-
tiered public health services networks,  exporting them to countries willing to improve 
their public health  systems and to extend  access  to basic health services to the 
poorest population groups. 35
34 See below, note 44.
35 Cuba might further specialize in the  provision of consulting servicesin the area of  planning and 
managing  decentralized, multiple-tiered public health services networks,  exporting them to countries 
willing to improve their public health  systems and to extend  access  to basic health services to the 
poorest population groups. Some pilot programmes of bilateral cooperation between Cuba and China in 
14
In general, Cuba should  exploit the possibilities offered by the  malleability of 
trade in services, promoting project-related multi-modal and inter-sectoral services 
exports, upgrading their value added and favouring the development of multiple intra- 
and inter-sectoral linkages between the health cluster and the rest  of the economy.. 
5. Cuba and the  offshore services global value chain 
To fully exploit its potential in the area of professional services, Cuba should 
elaborate and implement an integral export promotion strategy.. Crucial components 
of such a strategy are the creation of a favourable, export-oriented legal and 
institutional environment and an array of actions  aimed at support international 
competitiveness (Pico  García 2009a). 
The ultimate goal remains that of ascending in the global value chain of traded 
professional services, transforming  knowledge into value (see Triana Cordoví 2010). 
To this purpose, Cuba  should try  to jump on the fast train of the offshore services 
global value chain (see Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2010), and especially in the most 
advanced segments of  the pharmaceutical industry.  This new and booming industry 
exploits the potential offered by the most modern ITC technologies in order to 
segment more and more the  productive process,  outsourcing an ever-increasing 
the areas of consulting , designing and implementing  new forms of  public health  services delivery at 
local level are presently being carried out in some Chinese localities on an experimental basis (see 
People's Daily 2010).
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number of activities outside from the large firm and offshoring36 them  towards low-
cost locations, more and more in the developing world.  As a result, even in the global 
integrated value chains ultimately aimed at the production of goods (i.e.  medical 
products) formerly in-firm activities that were traditionally considered as fully 
belonging to the manufacturing sector are  transformed into  services: "The highly 
competitive environment forces these firms to change their procedures and be ready to 
meet new demands (these demands refer to more complex activities at lower prices). 
For this reason, as knowledge workers become the main source for creating value, the 
focus of business strategies is to gain advantage through talented workforce. Thus, 
while India and China currently lead supply in these segments, the fact that demand is 
being led by small and medium-sized companies offers a great opportunity for smaller 
countries with a pool of highly educated workers to begin to export services." (Gereffi 
and Fernandez-Stark 2010, p.38. See also Sen & Shiel, 2006).
These technological and  business trend, and especially the fact that many 
previously internal manufacturing activities   are transformed into specialized 
services that can be supplied cross-border under Mode 1   potentially offer a golden 
opportunity to  a country like Cuba. In fact, the island is   favourably endowed with 
specialized human capital and some  specialized facilities, and thus has a  distinctive 
comparative advantage in some knowledge-based  areas (mostly related to the health 
services and medical cluster). Yet, Cuba lacks the physical capital and  the overall 
industrial base that would be needed to carry out the whole set of integrated 
manufacturing processes that characterize advanced, high-tech manufacturing 
sectors.. 
The offshore services global value chain "revolution" can in principle allow to 
"jump" altogether  those crucial stages of  a broad-based national industrialization 
process that proved indispensable to underpin  sustained  growth and modernization in 
the history of most developing countries in the XXth century, allowing a country like 
Cuba to insert itself directly in the most convenient  segment of the global value 
36 A firm is outsourcing when it  externalizes tasks that were previously performed in-firm to an 
external  specialized provider, usually in the same country. If, the process involves a foreign external 
provider, the term offshoring is used. External providers might be more or less independent from the 
enterprise that produces the final goods or service. However, a transaction process (even if in some 
cases of intra-firm nature) consisting in the sale and purchase  of services does take place. In the case 
of offshoring, and in general where firms in the various parts of the value chain  are located in different 
countries,  the result is an expansion in international trade in services.  
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chain. Alas, this opportunity cannot be seized by Cuba under the present 
circumstances. Even the elite knowledge-based clusters  are still plagued by the 
country's overall lack of integration with the world economy37, and especially with 
the  TNCs s  that control and impulse the spread of the offshore services global value 
chain "revolution" in the present historical phase. 
Another extremely crippling constraint is constituted by the extreme 
underdevelopment of ICT, internet,  and  new generation telecom facilities in the 
island, which  implies difficulties of access and prohibitive operating and 
communicating costs38. In this particular domain, the policy space for the Cuban 
government is the strictly economic area is very limited, as most of these problem are 
direct or indirect consequences of the set of hostile measures enacted by the US  to 
sabotage the economy of the island, among which the trade embargo is only the most 
egregious one. In the key area of international electronic communications,  the US 
refusal to allow it  to access Internet through one of its submarine cables obliges 
Cuba to get the signal  from a satellite, thereby enormously increasing the cost of the 
service, curtailing its speed, and severely limiting its availability to users. Moreover, 
the embargo does not allow Cuba to get hold of  relatively simple software packages, 
as the informatics firms that produce and control them are mostly US based.39 In a 
more indirect way, Cuba's access to Internet and more generally its capability to 
participate in the global services value chain are also jeopardized by  several other 
specifically anti-Cuban  US laws, many of which have an extraterritorial scope. The 
negative impact of these  measures is felt especially in the areas of financing and 
subcontracting40. 
37 Progress is being made especially in the area of regional and South-South cooperation, noticeably in 
the ALBA framework.
38 As mentioned above, Cuba is endowed with a  specialized university campus focusing on ICT and 
telecom technologies. The problem, as usual, is that this far-reaching investment in human capital has 
not been  matched so far by a correspondent  investment  in hardware, telecom infrastructure, and other 
physical capital endowments.
39 Even if these firms were based elsewhere, they would easily be blackmailed by the anti-Cuban 
embargo dispositions, due to the crucial importance of the  US market. 
40 These observations on the severe impact of the US anti-Cuban legislation  have been suggested to 
the author by D.ra Nieves Pico García in a written communication received on October 13, 2010. 
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Quite apart from the  future of direct Cuba-US negotiations, however, the 
impact of the embargo is already, if  slowly,  weakening, along with the loss of 
centrality of the US as a lone superpower and the mergence of China and other new 
economic , technological and political powerhouses (see…). In this context, Cuban 
policy-makers might strive to multiply their already on-going efforts to strike strategic 
alliances with non US, rival TNCs (mainly those operating in the health, drugs and 
medical manufacturing), and keep developing various forms of technological and 
financial cooperation and integration with countries such as Venezuela, China, 
Russia, Brazil, and the like. An important example in this domain, that holds the 
potential to release most of the constraints imposed on Cuba's access to international 
communications by hostile US legislation,  is  the ongoing project  to lay an undersea 
high speed fibre-optic cable from Venezuela to Cuba. The project is being executed 
by  the Venezuelan/Cuban joint venture Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe (TGC)41, 
and is expected to become operational in July, 2011 (Fiercetelecom 2010)42.
41 TGC was granted a licence in November 2009 to install a submarine cable between Caracas 
(Venezuela), Havana (Cuba) and Kingston (Jamaica). The concession also includes a spur to Haiti. 
TGC is 60% owned by state-run Telecom Venezuela, and  the remainder is held by Cuba's Telco 
Transbit. In March 2010 Cable & Wireless announced  it had struck a deal with TGC to build the 
Jamaica-Cuba link. The hardware and equipment  for the project is supplied by  Alcatel-Lucent 
Information Policy 2010).
42 The agency  was reporting  a declaration to the Cuban newspaper Granma by Alberto Rodriguez, 
Cuba's vice minister of information and communications.
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6.   Challenges 
Notwithstanding the merits of their stellar  performance in recent years, 
professional services face  some serious problems that jeopardize their capability to 
keep playing  a pivotal export role in a sustainable fashion.
First of all, the  surge in professional services exports has been made possible 
so far essentially by shifting towards foreign markets part of the supply potential 
created by  past and present human capital investments, a part which would have been 
underutilized otherwise.43 But doctors as are not  mass-produced manufacturing 
goods. Before becoming "marketable", they require  many years of highly specialized 
training, and productivity in the “doctor’s production function” can hardly improve. 
As a general rule,  productivity can improve fast in the sectors  where it is feasible to 
apply ever-increasing knowledge to the material transformation of  nature,  producing 
more and more commodities  of ever-increasing quality. Yet,  such rapid productivity 
gains cannot be harvested  in the domain of  specialized human capital formation, 
taking into account the very nature of learning and  the heavy dependence of teaching 
from reciprocal human interaction ( see Triana Cordoví  2008, 2010,  Triana Cordoví, 
Torres Pérez  and Martín Fernández 2005, Gabriele 2010).
The second drawback stems from the fact   that professional services  have 
few forward economy and backward linkages with goods producing sectors and also 
with other services sectors, and their virtuous multiplier and spillover effects are 
correspondently limited (see Gabriele 2010). Professional services  staff  actually 
constitute a kind of elite enclave of very skilled and quite productive (even if badly 
paid) workers quite detached form the rest of the economy, where most of the 
workforce is trapped in a vicious low productivity, low wages trap. This elite sub-
sector  is  very human capital-intensive but is not physical- and financial capital-
intensive44, and has  constituted itself into an  advanced enclave, largely insulated 
from the overall underdevelopment  and poorly performing scenario prevailing in the 
43 Of course, such a process could only proceed at quasi-zero cost to a point, and Cuba has already 
gone very far in a very short time. People routinely complain that as too many of the best doctors have 
gone  abroad, the functioning of the public health system  in Cuba itself  (and  due also to the  lack of 
drugs and medical equipment, now aggravated by the most recent crisis) has markedly worsened. 
44 Here the term financial capital is to be  intended in a narrow sense, as referring to the liquid financial 
resources needed  to fund any production or formation process.
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bulk  of the Cuban economy. This dichotomy is made possible by the fact that  human 
capital is the only kind of capital that can be reproduced and expanded virtually by 
parthenogenesis. Each new vintage can be  generated by only a fraction of the labor 
force  embodied  in the already-existing human capital stock, and its functioning and 
reproduction capabilities are  largely independent from the performance of the goods-
producing macro-sector. 
Such peculiarities of professional services have so far constituted an element 
of strength for Cuba, but in the future they could also imply weaknesses. There are 
two main risks in the present state of affairs are two. One consists in a progressive 
isolation of professional services from worldwide scientific and technological 
progress. The another stems from  the insufficient development of  inter-sectoral 
linkages with  productive enterprises. In the most advanced and dynamic economies, 
these linkages allow enterprises' demand for potentially value-creating innovations to 
drive  S&T and R&D developments, technological progress and productivity 
improvements.  The  previously strict separation between the  transmission and 
generation of ideas, on one hand,  and that of material production, on the other hand, 
is getting progressively blurred.  The ever-faster circulation of new knowledge cannot 
be absorbed and further developed without the availability of advanced ICT and other 
specialized infrastructure and equipment, as well as rapid access to online information 
sources and an active two-way interaction with the enterprise sector.45 In Cuba, 
conversely,  due to the specific characteristics of professional services and the 
structural de-integration of the island's  economy, the specialist knowledge embodied 
in professional services human capital has been  be transmitted  to the goods-
producing macro-sector only to a very limited extent46  This limitation does not allow 
Cuba to reap the potential benefits that could stem from virtuous intra- and inter-
sectoral  spillovers and from  the conversion of immaterial knowledge into industry-
wide technical progress, leading to  enhanced systemic productivity and 
innovativeness also in the realm of the material production  of goods.  
Therefore, the jump in Cuba’s professional services exports, in absence of a 
proper enabling policy framework, would risk to prove itself just a once-and for-all 
45 See Gabriele and Khan 2010.
46 Among the positive examples there are the pioneering advances in the areas of biotechnology and 
few niches in the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industry (see Pico Garcia 2003, 2004, 
2009a,b, Pico Garcia  and Rodriguez 2006, Anaya Cruz & Fernandez 2009).
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occurrence. It is not intrinsically unsustainable per se, but it cannot constitute an 
adequate basis for further development, because essentially it has already reached the 
upper limits of its potential. In theoretical terms, it constitutes a unique jump of 
Cuba’s production frontier than cannot be simply replicated.
A further paradoxical implication is that the precarious external equilibrium 
position attained by Cuba since the mid-2000s is largely predicated on the 
international competitiveness (even if such a competitiveness is mostly revealed ex 
post in an ad hoc fashion)47  of a tiny elite knowledge-based sector. In most 
developing countries  the bulk  of the foreign exchange needed to ensure  the external 
equilibrium is generated by masses of unskilled and semiskilled workers operating 
under capitalist production relations, in export-oriented, labor-intensive goods-
producing sectors.48 Through their contribution  to the balance of payments 
equilibrium, these poorly skilled and poorly paid factory workers are pivotal in 
sustaining the subsistence consumption of their counterparts in non-tradable sectors, 
as well as  the conspicuous consumption of the bourgeoisie and the upper middle-
class, which enjoy a virtual monopoly on access to specialized knowledge, skills, and 
more broadly on the upper tiers of  human capital formation.49
In Cuba, as in many other domains, the situation is different. As there is no 
conspicuous consumption as a macroeconomic  phenomenon to speak of, the bare 
subsistence consumption of the vast majority of less educated and less skilled workers 
prisoners of the above-mentioned productivity trap is ultimately dependent on the 
foreign exchange-generating capacity of  a very small group of highly skilled 
professionals. Thus, focusing narrowly on  the respective international 
competitiveness and value-generating ability of different sectors (were value is 
measured exclusively in terms of foreign exchange), it might be argued that Cuba is 
47 I.e., in the framework of bilateral trade agreements were import and export prices do not necessarily 
coincide with those of international market. As argued before, however, the international 
competitiveness of Cuba’s MS exports, in particular, is confirmed by the modest but significant part of 
these services exports that is sold directly in international markets, outside the planned framework of 
bilateral agreements.
48 In some  developing, countries and in many least developed countries the most important exporting 
sector is tourism,  a labor-intensive services activity.
49 In China and Vietnam there is not a  virtual monopoly of a small class on the  bulk of the means of 
production, and access to high-level human capital formation is (at least in principle) based on more 
egalitarian and meritocratic criteria. However, in market-socialist  Asian countries  as well  the 
sustainability of the balance of payments is mainly predicated on the value generated by large masses 
of  educated but relatively unskilled workers.
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the only country in the world were the many  unskilled and less educated50 ordinary 
workers are “exploiting” the few highly skilled and well educated professionals.51 
Such a paradox might be socially progressive, but it needs eventually to be overcome, 
allowing specialized knowledge to flow smoothly towards the sphere of material 
production, and thereby contributing to sustainable productivity gains in the bulk of 
Cuba's industrial and agricultural activities.
7. Towards a knowledge-based development path?
In sum, the  important progress already achieved in developing professional 
services into a sector that also (besides directly supplying basic services to the Cuban 
population) provides crucial foreign exchange earnings cannot be taken for granted, 
unless it is accompanied by a series of complementary “industrial”52 policies aimed at 
further transforming, enriching and diversify this and other services sectors, and to 
strengthen their linkages with the rest of the economy . 
The latter observation applies particularly to the challenge of nurturing  the 
fledgling health cluster53. Focused industrial policies pivoting on exploiting the latent 
50 By Cuban standards.
51 Actually, a partly comparable example exists of a developing country where an advanced, human 
capital-intensive  services sector plays a very important role with respect to the balance of payments, 
while the bulk of the unskilled working force is trapped in low-productivity equilibrium. The country is 
India, and the sector is that of offshore IT services.  This industry provides over 1/4 of India's export 
revenues, and generates positive technological and managerial spillovers. Yet it  employs "only" about 
two million of mostly middle class engineers and other  very skilled workers, and its direct contribute 
to poverty alleviation is therefore negligible (see NASSCOM  2009, Gereffi G.& Fernandez-Stark K., 
2010).  
52 Professional services, like any other sector of Cuba's economy,  would also benefit from the 
implementation of a comprehensive macroeconomic  program of  reforms aimed at overcoming the 
major structural drawbacks and contradiction of the state socialist model(see Gabriele 2010)..
53 Besides the health cluster, there is potential for further development and the creation of international 
competitive advantages also in other professional  services.  
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spillovers  and linkages potential between health services proper and some specialized 
health-related manufacturing sub-sectors might  allow for the formation of specialized 
high-tech manufacturing niches. 
The formulation and effective implementation of suitable sectoral industrial 
policies, however, constitutes a necessary, but not a sufficient condition  for attaining 
these ambitious goals. The development of advanced  services exports is hampered by 
serious  systemic problems, all of them ultimately attributable to the core structural 
weaknesses of state socialism itself. Therefore,  professional services, like any other 
sector of Cuba's economy,  would also benefit greatly from the implementation of a 
comprehensive macroeconomic  program of  reforms aimed at overcoming the major 
structural drawbacks and contradiction of the state socialist model (see Gabriele 
2010).
The most binding constraints affecting the development of the export potential 
of professional services and of the health cluster are are the lack of a well-developed 
export-oriented culture, the insufficient flexibility of  the institutional structure, and 
the inadequate degree of coordination and export-oriented focus of all the public 
entities involved in the area of tradable services  (see Pico García 2009a,b).54 
Knowledge of services exports modalities and the actions required to promote them 
its specificities are not widespread enough. In particular, it is common to identify 
services exports exclusively with Mode 4, thereby underestimating the opportunities 
and challenges stemming from the increasingly inter-modal and integrated nature of 
advanced services delivery to foreign  clients.
Specific hurdles stem from the obstacles posed by the central planning 
mechanism to the development of market-based horizontal inter-firm linkages, from 
the need for each of them to obtain  a specific authorization in order to start exporting, 
and from the still inadequate ability on the part of policy-makers to coordinate  the 
efforts of various layers  of firms and other institutions towards the promotion of 
services exports. Planning institutions such as the  Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y 
la  Inversión Extranjera (MINCEX) y el Ministerio de Economía y Planificación 
(MEP), are  endowed with good relatively good human capital resources and are 
culturally aware of the  crucial role of export promotion. Yet, the complex task of 
54 Analytical and strategy  formulation capabilities are constrained by lack of reliable statistics. 
Personnel formation in areas such as  marketing and foreign languages is inadequate, leading in many 
cases to lack of  skills and motivation.  
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maximizing  inter-firm and inter-inter-institutional synergies  in the framework of an 
export-enhancing planning exercise  is far from being  fully accomplished. 
In this respect, it can be observed that the guiding, coordinating  and regulatory role 
of  the planning mechanism and the dominance of  public ownership55 among  elite 
services exporting firms should not  be discarded.  However,  hierarchical and vertical 
forms of coordination should  be at least partially substituted, or at least 
complemented, by market-based, monetary and commercial forms of inter-firm 
interaction. In this domain Cuba might profit learning the appropriate lessons from the 
successful experience of China's predominantly public system of national innovation 
to improve the country's international competitiveness  and export potential in many 
high-tech domains, after a series of reforms that, among other things,  have boosted 
the  development of market-based, incentive-enhancing  interactions  among state-
owned firms and research institutions.56
If successful, such systemic reforms might achieve the key goal of 
consolidating and enhancing the progress already achieved in the area of export-
oriented professional services, thereby contributing decisively to the sustainability of 
Cuba's balance of payments. Moreover, in the long run, professional services and the 
health cluster in particular might play a vanguard role in steering the  Cuban economy 
as a whole towards a  knowledge-based development path.  
55 However, joint-ventures and other forms of association with  foreign enterprises should be actively 
promoted. In the future, it is also conceivable that, in an overall framework of market-oriented 
liberalization, privately- or cooperatively-owned specialized, science-based, and export-oriented Cuban 
firms might  emerge as well.
56 See Gabriele and Khan 2010.
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